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I:\ THE SUPREe!E COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF CT."\H,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
14586

~s
\HLLL~·l

L.

FO~<S

:1'TH,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEr OF RESPONDENT

STt\TE'-1E:JT OF THE CASE
Thr~

2pr·~llant,

\~illiam

L. Forsyth, appeals from

an oc·dcr c1'ce:r:iw.; his Dotioil to 1-:ithdraw his guilty plea and
ju0JDeJt anl s0rtcncc entered thereon in the Fourth Judicial

J. Rob·:::r+-

i~ll]l':Jr:::-:,

prc::..;iding.
It; 'l'HS LO\VER COURT

Jl

'~. ~ ':-

r.rJtiun to •. :i lhc1r<:llv his guilty plea
I

l

-~

l
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and appellant 1·1as sentenced for an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Prison, with execution of the sentence stayed
pending appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the order denying
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent substantially agrees with appellant's
Statement of Facts, but makes the following deletions,
additions and corrections:
1.

On August 11 and 12, 1975, after the

prelimina~

hearing, appellant and his original counsel discussed the
matters involved, the importance of the preparation, and
counsel's fee
h~

had ts

cc 0

requi~ements
~-~e

~ricnds

(Tr.50).

Appellant stated that

and relatives to arrange for the

fee and get back to his counsel (Tr.51).

Between the

menton September 12, 1975, and the trial date on

arraiq~.-

Jan~ary

5,

1976, however, appellant contacted his counsel only once and
had failed to make the necessary arrangements.

Appellant's

counsel had tried many times but failed to contact appellant
(Tr. 51-54).

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.

During appellant's colloquy with the court

concerning the voluntariness of his guilty plea, he

s~ated

that he had not been threatened by anyone except the pursuit
of other charges against him if he did not plead guilty (Tr.
7 3) •

3.

Appellant made no complaints about his

attorney up to the time of his guilty plea.

4.

The prosecutor denied that any of his statements

during the plea bargaining process were not in compliance
with the A.B.A. Canons of Ethics and claimed that appellant's
motives in pleading guilty, attempting to withdraw the
plea, not cooperating with counsel, and not cooperating
with Adult Probation and Parole were merely to manipulate
the entire judicial process
5.

(Tr.lOO).

The probable cause standard enunciated by

the court was in reference to the sufficiency of appellant's
alleged defense during the hearing on the motion to withdraw
and not in reference to sufficiency of the State's evidence
(Tr .117) .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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ARGllt-!ENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA

\~AS

MADE VOLU:,TARILY

AND FREE FROM COERCION BECAUSE ANY STATEMENTS 1-L"'·.DE BY 'T!IE
PROSECUTION DID NOT OVERCOME THE \viLL OF THE

TO

APPsLLA~T

RATIONALLY WEIGH THE CHOICES BEFORE HH!.
In determining the voluntariness of a guilty
plea,

the United States Supreme Court,

in an article

contained in 25 L.Ed.2d 1025, 1029-30 (1971), enumerated
a number of factors which can be taken into consideration,
among them whether the plea was induced by some form of
coercion, such as threats or intimidation.

Appellant

alleges that his guilty plea was coerced as a result of
threats by the

pr0secu~ion

and his own counsel and by his

counsel's conduct with respect to financial matters.

Even

if such threats were in fact made, it does not necessarily
follow that the guilty plea was coerced.
to relief, appellant must show (1)
made;

To be entitled

that the threats were

(2) that such threats did in fact influence him;

and (3) that the influence was such that it amounted to
coercion.

Gardner v. State, 537 P.2d 467 (Nev. 1975).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In determining whether or not appellant was in fact coerced,
the court may consider all of the evidence including the
record taken at the time the appellant entered his plea of
guilty.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463,

25 L.Ed. 2d 747 (1970).
The fact that any threats were ever made by the
prosecution to the appellant was strongly contested by the
prosecution with the following:
"There is no time when the
defendant has been--when I have had
direct contact with the defendant.
I have made comments with regard to
plea bargaining in the matter with
defendant's counsel in his law office.
At this time the defendant was not
present.
I made statements to the
defendant's attorney in the hall
probably less than a minute, in
discussing some of the pros and cons
of him pleading. At no time were any
of these discussions not in compliance
with the A.B.A. Canons of Ethics with
regard to plea bargaining in criminal
matters.
It is my opinion, your Honor,
that the defendant has attempted to
manipulate his own counsel in this case,
he's- attempted to manipulate the Federal
Court to get involved in the State in
this case at this time, he's attempted
to manipulate the Adult Probation and
Parole, and he's attempted to manipulate
this court with regard to the entire
.oc-ocePdinqs."
(Tr .100).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The test for determining whether or not tr. .::se
statements, if any, did sufficiently influence the
appellant in his decision to plead c;ui l ty, was outli:·E'd
in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323, 324
(1969), where this Court stated:
"But the mere fQct that a
defendant, against whom there are
multiple cha~ges pending, pleads
guilty to on~ of them on the condition that the others be dropped
certainly does not in and of itself
compel a finding of coercion.
There
is nothing in this regard to justify
a conclusion that the will of the
plaintiff (sic "defendant") was
overcome, or that he did not
rationally weigh the choices before
him and choose the one which he then
thought was most beneficial to his
interest."
In accordance

wit~

~he

great volume of caselaw in this

area, Strong 1ndicates that in determining the voluntariness
of a guilty plea, courts of necessity must focus on the ques:
of what factor or factors motivated
guilty in a particular case.

d

defendant to plead

If, for example, the guilty

plea was the considered choice of the accused, free of
coercion, promises or any other factor or inducement which
overcame the will of the accused, and was a

free

open to him, the plea is said to be voluntary.

and

This is true
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regardless of the defendant's guilt of the specific crime
in question.

If, on the other hand, the accused pleaded

guilty because of some influence not properly to be
considered as a factor in his decision, then the plea
is said not to be voluntary.
ex rel.

Bro~n

See, e.g., United States

v. LuVallee, 301 F.Supp. 1245, 1253 (S.D.N.Y.

1969).

The Court in Brady, supra, also emphasized that
possible innocence of the defendant and certain encourageDents and motivations by the prosecution are not solely
d~terminativc

of the coercion question.

It was said there:

"The State to some degree encourages
pleas of guilty at every important step
in the criminal process. For some people
their breach of a State's law is alone
sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For
others, apprehension and charge, both
threatening acts by the Government, jar
them into admitting their guilt.
In still
other cases the post-indictment accumulation of
evidence m~y con~ince the defendant and his
counsel that a trial is not worth the agony
etn:l expense to the defendant and his family.
All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite
of the State's responsibility for some of
th~ fetctors motivating the pleas; the pleas
arc no more improperly compelled than is the
decision bv a defendant at the close of the
Sc;1t•·'s ('\·irlc>nc" at trial that he must take
:-+-- :._l

'-',1:1\-l•...;L -L:.._lllo

II

397

I'
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Respondent contends that the detailed transcript
of the inquiry by the trial court into the volunt1riness
of the guilty plea clearly established no cocrci:Jl1 sufficient to overcome the free will of the appellant (Tr.69-74).
Appellant specifically stated that he had not be2n threatene:
with

anythi~g

other than the pursuit of charges agreed to be

dropped in accordance with the plea bargain (Tr.73).

In

addition, contrary to his assertion that he anticipated
probation, appellant stated he had not been promised
anything and was told to dismiss any promise from his
consideration (Tr.70,72,73,97).

Moreover, not only is

appellant's belief as to his innocence not conclusive as
to involuntariness, as stated above, but appellant stated,
after

conferr~~g

~1th

his counsel, that he pleaded guilty

because he was guilty (Tr.72).

Finally, any possible

adverse financial considerations could validly form the
basis of a guilty plea under Brady, supra.

For these

reasons, it is clear that appellant was not coerced or
threatened beyond that of the realities for any defendant
in any case.

He rationally weighed the choices before

him and in light of the evidence, would have undoubtedly
plectd

("):;' .: u t ~l ~-':.

statements or adverse financial circumstances.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
Tf:F. 'i'RIAL COU'.<T COERECTLY USED A PROBABLE
C<.CSI: Sc.>:;J:,RD Ill DETER:iiNING FACTUAL BASIS FOR
'>!'S GUILTY PLEA BEC.'·USI: A DETERHINATION OF GUILT
3Ei"OND A ?.t.,'\SOcYA3LE DOUBT OR EVEN BY THE PREPOHDERANCE
C." THI: E\JIDI:1:CE

IS

U~HJECESSARY.

Prioc to a complete summary of evidence by the
pros~cuti~~

~ith

respect to appellant's guilt, the

court considered the question of whether appellant had
a r,,eritorious defense to the prosecution's claims.
At this

ti~e

the court stated that it was using a

probable cause standard rather than beyond a reasonable doubt

(Tr.ll7).

The court noted that it was

not necesEary to establish the defense beyond a
re~sonabl~

~oubt

since that standard is normally left

to the jury during a trial.
standard
~0"cnsc.

~2s

The question as to the

raised by the prosecution and not the

~~2th0r

the court used a probable cause

''tc nclo.ru 2.n c1eterr:,i•,ing factual basis of all the evidence

Al tLou<Jh
t~c

issu~

o"

~h~th~r

r11an~'

c:1ses are presented with

th0re is a sufficient factual

LFlsis for • ,,,. c;uilt'/ pl0a, most courts fail to

-9-
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tt~i.3l

COl

b.J.sis of

~lc2ded

c1uilt~·

he

~Q~e

nc assertions of

thr·

r)!r:J.

innoc~n~~.

Jt

was only at the
~:p~::llar.t

ti~~

cont·~nded

t'nt once tl.t' tL-ic.tl
tb~re

is c.t factual

need not r0itcratc

of

~ithJrawal

of the plea that

innocencr:.
couL-~

~asis

~ll

h:~s

satisfied lts ·1,- t:",at

for the guilty plea

of the

evi~cnce

an~

agains~

it

--~

This c.l:o:;
c:~~h2si~c~

t!12t tht· trial c0urt used a probable

=a~se

to appellant's allege2

- L I!~

ll'"l7 t

1
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETElCIHNED THERE
1:'\S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A FACTUt\L Ill\SIS
FOR APPELLACIT' S GUILTY PLEl\.
It is a

well-settl~d

rule

~hat

the trial

court is not required to specifically require of
the defendant as to the factu2l basis for a
of guilty.

pl2~

Inquiring of the county attorney,

examination of the presentence report, minutes of
testimony, conversations with both sides during a
plea negotiation conference, or from any othnr part
of the record,
methods.
142

if before the court, are altc:,:native

State v. Painter, 195

(1976); PeOiJle v. Emery,

~eb.

30 Ill.App .

N.E.2d 43

(1976);

C:+:::.':<: •.·.

P.2d lllS

(l'JI~;;

, ,]·,l·..e ·:. Robinson,

757,

329 N.E.2d 317

183,

Huizar,

237 N.W.2d
.3d 466,

112 Adz.
28

344

J89,

543

Ill. .ll.pp.

3d

(1975).

From the record it is clear that the trial ccu:-t
satisfied itself the;re 1:u.s a
guilty plea.

fact•Jal basis for- the

l;t the ti111e of the plea appc ll.>nt •;r,ccif icall:

stated that he pleaded CJUilty b2cause he
( tr. 72).

')tcilt'.'

In addition, Count I o: thr· Inforrnation \:,<;

certain regarding th~ ocfcn::;c: to \.llich
(Tr.69).

\·:cts

By the

tiwe>

of

l11.'

1,?a:~

t(>

f'~t u:

the cleci•;ir·:l on :w:nl! :nc ':;
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rrction to

withdra~

had nJt been filed

the plEa the presentence report
(7r.lS4).

During the hearing on

appellant's motion to withCraw the plea the court
listened to fourteen

tra~script

pages of evidence

presented by the prosecution as to what evidence it
intended to introduce into trial

(Tr.l26-l39).

This

is in addition to the fact that the appellant had
appeared before the trial court at least eight times
upon different motions and circumstances and was thus
well aware of the factual basis behind the plea.
Appellant contends that the trial court failed
to find a sufficient factual basis to support appellant's
intent to coiT\Ii,i.t
Ann. § 76-6-405 (i)

the crme, as required by Utah Code
(Supp. 1975).

The prosecution

detailed the scheme of appellant and explained several
times how intent could be shown from the deception
(Tr. 126-128, 131, 136).
it

~as

As stated under Point II above,

unnecessary for the trial court to resolve all

questions beyond a reasonable doubt.
Higgins, 348

In Interest of

N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ill. App. 1976), where

defendant's guilty plea to the crime of battery was
accepted over the possible defense of self-defense,
: ' ' ~ _l ~-~ ' :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The require8ent that the
trial coL~t be satisfied there
is a fact~al basis for the plea
before accepting a guilt~ plea
does not compel the court to
resolve all contradictory eviden~e
in the case. The court need not
be convinced beyond a reascnable
doubt there is a factual basis
for each elenent of the offense
charged."
For these reasons, respond~nt contends the
trial court correctly determined there was sufficient
evidence to form a factual basis for appellant's
guilty plea.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DETERIHNING THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT PRESEtiT A
PLAUSIBLE BASIS FOR WITHDRAWING HIS GUILTY PLEA.
It is also a well settled standard in the State
of Utah that the granting or refusing to permit the
withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter which lies in
the sound discretion of the trial judge.

Henline v.

Smith, 548 P.2d 1271 (1976); State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d
124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d
913 (lOth Cir. 1973); State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7
P.2d 825 (1932).

This is in accordance with the lltah
:Zl.

, i

(1953), which states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"The court may at any time
before judgment, upon a plea of
guilty, permit it to be withdrawn
and a plea of not guilty substituted."
Under Point I above, it was shown that appellant's
guilty plea was not coerced because he was able to make a free
and rational decision between the available alternatives.
stateme~ts

Any

by the prosecution or appellant's original counsel

were not sufficient to overcome the will of the appellant.
Thus, any alleged coercive statements cannot be considered
as factors in determining the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
Appellant alleges three factors which the court
failed to consider in its decision to deny appellant's motion
to withdra<.J:

no prejudice to the State; this was a pre-sentence

motion; and appellant's innocence.

Respondent admits that

post-sentence motions to withdraw may be somewhat less
reliable, but contends that simply because the motion was
made prior to sentencing does not call for a wholesale abandonment of guilty pleas.

In the present case, it should be

remembered that appellant agreed to plead guilty pursuant to
a plea

barg~ining

process, upon the advice of competent counsel,

voluntarily and understandinqly, during an extended dialogue
r•'_, •
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the promised bargain by the prosecution.

The proscc·tion

kept its part of the bargain by dismissing u series
counts of the information pursuant to the

agrec~ent.

o~

In

Stinson, supra, the court held that where the appPll.ont
had made a recent and clear statement before the

scnt~ncing

judge that he understood the charge and the naximur1 pcmi shrnent and the judge was advised of the plea bargain, the
refusal to permit the plea to be withdrawn was not an abuse
of discretion by the State trial court.
Other cases have reached similar results.

In

State v. Huntlev, 129 N.J. Super. 13, 322 A.2d 177, 179
(1974), where appellant desired to withdraw his guilty plea:
to robbery and sodomy crier to sentencing, the court held:
"'c,e have canvassed the entire
rLcLrd and agree with the trial judge
that the guilty pleas were voluntarily
and knowingly entered, and that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in refusing to permit withdrawal of the
pleas.
. Defendant's vare assertions
that he mistakenly entered his guilty
pleas, and that he was improperly coerced
to do so, are unsupported in the record.
His late protestations of innocence, and
the victim's certification of defendant's
innocence on the sodomy charge were found
to be unworthy of belief, and were properly
rejected by the trial judge.
Th~ fiqure

o:=
L

,)

]u:~~j_(..":-::.
~

'tO.·; ,.

1S

u~~~rJ1r·j,,r[

L·~~-

-i~

-.-,

1

t,li

'" J,:

justice.
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. when a voluntary and knowing
plea bargain has been entered into
simultaneously with the guilty plea,
defendant's burden of presenting a
plausible basis for his request to
withdraw his guilty plea is heavier.
The approved philosophy of 'plea
bargaining' is dependent upon the good
faith of both sides in carrying out the
bargain when it is voluntarily and
knowingly made, is fair and just and is
ultimately approved by the trial judge.
A \·JhiD.sical change of mind by defendant,
or the prosecutor, will not be a valid
reason for altering the bargain .
Even a belated assertion of innocence
will not upset an otherwise validly
entered into plea bargain." North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct.
160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
(Emphasis
added . )
In State v. Ellison, lll Ariz. 167, 526 P.2d 706,
707

(1974), the Court said:
"It is not sufficient to show that
the defendant merely changed his mind if
he \·lOS advised by counsel throughout the
proce~dings, understood the proceedings
to the best of his ability, and was under
no coercion or misapprehension concerning
the consPquences of his guilty plea.
In foct, a defense attorney may be performing
his best service for his client in advising
him to ploaJ guilty as a means of bargaining
for the most lenient treatment possible."
theso roasor.s it is clear that merely because the appellant

Fe•
r·•H),.

his i• •LJr(•J un>hcst:<ti0!1S of innoc:ence prior to sentencing,
l \ : -.. ·

l_~""-' L '-' '"l •
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court specifically determined appellant's motives of
manipulating the system and correctly used its discrc"ion
to deny appellant's motion.
POINT V
APPELLANT RECEIVED ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF
COMPETENT COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS ATTORNEY \\1AS A CO:·lPET.' .T
MEMBER OF THE BAR WHO SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO IDENTJFY
HIMSELF WITH AND REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF APPELLANT IN
GOOD FAITH.
The right to effective or adequate assistan2e of
counsel was first enunciated by the United States Suprenc
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 L.Ed. 158, 53
S.Ct. 55 (1932), which held that failure to make an
effective

appoi~t~~~c

of counsel violates the Sixth

Amendment right t:J counsel and is a denial of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Later cases have held that adequate assistance of
counsel depends on whether the advice to plead guilty was
within the range of competence demanoed of attorneys in
criminal cases.

McMann v. Richardson,

s.ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed. 2d 763
4~l

(_j •

s•

~ ~~

1

Sl

j

..~,.

Ct •

l ;, ( I /

(1970);
• (",

397 U.S. 759, 90

'l'ollett~·_.___II~_I2~~>_Cl_l'1•

l,. ,<:.
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Beyond the general tests hinted in Tollett and McMann,
ho~ever,

lo~er

the Supreme Court has relegated to state and

courts the task of defining more specifically

the standard of adequate representation by counsel.
In Strong v. Turner, supra, this Court outlined
the test of competence of court appointed counsel in

~e-

trial proceedings with respect to a guilty plea as follows:
"No one will question that the
right of an accused to counsel means
by a competent member of the Bar who
shows a willingness to identify
himself Hith and represent the interests:
of the defendant in good faith."
452 P.2d at 324.
The

cou~t

held that the mere fact that counsel held

relatively brief conferences with the accused prior to
entry of the guilty plea did not establish that the aCJ:Used
was denied effective representation by counsel.

Other

Utah cases also suggest that the Court look to the
record for suggestions of "bad faith conduct on the pan:t
of the ottorne·,·."

412 P.2c1 449

\'lashing ton v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 361,

(1966).

This concept of "bad faith" was
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"The [due process] requirement
[of counsel] is not satisfied by a
sh~m or oretense of an appearance in
th~, record by an attorney who
manifests no real concern about the
interests of the accused."
(Emphasis
added.)
Appellant does not contend that his origiuctl
counsel was incompetent.

He maintains, however,

tha~

counsel's representation with respect to fees and probation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent contends that the record clearly shows
appellant had not only adequate but effective assistance
of competent counsel.
It should be noted preliminarily that appellant's
counsel in the present case was pri\·ately retai:1ed rather t':
court assignee::.

~r.:.s

Cm1rt in Stronq, supra, observed that

counsel was court-appointed and many other

cour~s

similar distinction.

Es~eele,

See, e.g.,

Lo~tis

v.

nake a
515

F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975); Da\·is \". Sla\·ton, 353 F.Supp.
571 (\'a. 1973);

·~:odern

Status of Eule as to

Federal Court of Effective Representation bv
26 A.L.R. Fed.

218, 23S

Tes~

in

Cc~~sel,"

(19"76).

c~oosin.;:.
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Other facts support the contention that appellant
was adequately represented.

On January 5, 1976, the court

entertained defense counsel's motion for continuance.
Grounds for the continuance were stated by appellant's
counsel as follows:
"A preliminary hearing was held
August llth and 12th I believe, Your
Honor.
At that time I discussed with
ny client the matters involved, the
importance of the preparation and my
fee requirements. My client stated that
he would attend to these matters. We
came to--or I came to Provo, defendant
lives in Orem, he was arraigned and trial
was set in this matter for January 5, 1976 .
.:>.nd that was on the 12th day of September,
1975. Thereafter, Your Honor, my client
informed me that he had several small
business matters to attend to, that he
had to see some of his friends and relatives
to arrange for the fee, and that he would be
back in contact with me shortly to make his
records available to me and to review the
situation.
I did not again hear from my
client until December 2, 1975.
In the
meantime I had written several letters to
his residence, which he did not receive
because he was not there and apparently not
in contact with them.
My client agreed to be
in on the lOth.
He did not come in. He
called my office on Saturday the 12th or 13th
and said that he would--spoke to my secretary,
sait th::tt hce would be in the follm.;ing week.
HP did not come in.
I finally reached him by
tclc·rhcHcC, and he came to my office on Honday
"c;llo•.:it·"; Cbric,tn,,c;, that \vould have been
lu .:,,

~

' ' l

( ,,

~

_-, : ~

.

r·>.(·nirq ur tlcr_• follo· ..,ing dL!y."

,j~'

;l.l..__:,\.

l) ' t ::; i. ;' ,. -~ .::: -~
L.l-~lC"

(Tr. 50-51)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-21Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

"The [due process] requirement
[of counsel] is not satisfied by a
sham or oretense of an appearance in
th2 record by an attorney who
manifests no real co~cern about the
interests of the accused."
(Emphasis
added.)
Appellant does not contend that his originctl
counsel was incompetent.

He maintains, however,

that

counsel's representation with respect to fees and probation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent contends that the record clearly shows
appellant had not only adequate but effective assistance
of competent counsel.
It should be noted preliminarily that appellant's
counsel in the present case was privately retained rather
court assigned.

t~

This Court in Strong, supra, observed that

counsel was court-appointed and many other courts make a
similar distinction.

See, e.g., Loftis v. Esteele, 515

F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Slayton, 353 F.Supp.
571 (Va. 1973); "Modern Status of Rule as to Test in
Federal Court of Effective Representation by Counsel,"
26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 238

(1976).

Although such a distinction

is not determinative of appellant's claims, it is important

choosing.
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Other facts support the contention that appellant
was adequately represented.

On January 5, 1976, the court

entertained defense counsel's motion for continuance.
Grounds for the continuance were stated by appellant's
counsel as follows:
"A preliminary hearing was held
August llth and 12th I believe, Your
Hone~.
At that time I discussed with
Dy client the matters involved, the
importance of the preparation and my
fee requirements.
My client stated that
he would attend to these matters. We
came to--or I came to Provo, defendant
lives in Orem, he was arraigned and trial
was set in this matter for January 5, 1976.
,\nd that \·.'CIS on the 12th day of September,
1975. Thereafter, Your Honor, my client
informed n'2 that he had several small
business matters to attend to, that he
had to see some of his friends and relatives
to arrange for the fee, and that he would be
back in contact with me shortly to make his
record~ available to me and to review the
situation.
I did not again hear from my
client until December 2, 1975.
In the
~eantime I
had written several letters to
his residence, which he did not receive
bccau3c he was not there and apparently not
in contact with them.
My client agreed to be
in on the lOth.
He did not come in. He
called my office on Saturday the 12th or 13th
and suid thut he would--spoke to my secretary,
s:1it th:1t h,, \vOuld be in the follm·;ing week.
lk dic1 not come in.
I finally reached him by
tclcpho•,c, etncl he ca01e to my office on Honday
~r1l

1

o'./it·,,

C1lri.st·--·Ll~,

th.:tt \v·ould have been
,"""~ : ~

lu

",,'

._,

~·

~

1

-~

.._; .(

; ) ·_: -3
::_;

i. ;

1

-'

.:i - ~

cl ;:-_

(Tr.50-51)
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Appellant's counsel also showed his willingness
to represent appellant after the hearing when he entered
into plea negotiations at the request of the prosecutjun
(Tr.20-2l).

Moreover, appellant's counsel continued to be

interested and participate in the case even when
hired another attorney.

appel~~nt

At no time prior to or during the

entry of the guilty plea did appellant express his dissatisfaction with his counsel.

And, as stated in

~.

supra, financial circumstances can justifiably form the
basis of a guilty plea.

For these reasons,

respon~~nt

contends that appellant was adequately represented by
counsel and any fears he acquired were unjustified and
unreasonable
to advise

h~~

i~

light of his attorney's good faith effort

of the most beneficial course of conduct.
CONCLUSION

Because appellant was not coerced into entering
his guilty plea, his plea was supported by adequate factual
basis according to the correct standard of the trial

c•Jc~rt,

his motion to withdraw the plea was discretionary with the
trial court and he •:1as effectively r<:'presentcd by cou'1sel,
respondent respectfully rf'qucsts Lhat this C'Olll·t .1i·,c•ltc;s
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appellant's appeal and affirm the judgment and sentence
of the trial

co~r~

rendered below.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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